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Abstract 
This  piece  begins  by  illustrating  the  current  status  of  United  Nations  targeted  sanctions 
regimes, from the formal point of view. It then proceeds to explain the mechanisms of listing and de-
listing at the UN level, as well as the means by which UN Member States, and the European Union, 
implement these sanctions in their national (regional) legal orders, and why the chosen means of 
implementation create potential situations where the states (the EU) might find themselves in breach 
of differing international obligations. In the final part, the article shows how the major international 
European courts (the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human 
Rights) have dealt with this potential conflict, and posits that their approaches are very different and 
will  have  different  consequences:  i.e.  whereas  the  CJEU  has  taken  a  militant  approach,  which 
threatens to damage the unity of international law, the ECtHR has taken an unitary approach, which 
strengthens the international system, while also promoting human rights over sanctions. 
Keywords:  UN,  targeted  sanctions,  CJEU,  ECtHR,  Article  103,  international 
obligations, human rights, 1267 Committee 
Introduction 
1 The international practice of targeted sanctions is a fairly recent development of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) practice. The thinking behind such an approach is 
that comprehensive economic sanctions have an indiscriminate impact on a country and can 
entail  severe  negative  humanitarian  consequences  for  the  civilian  population  and  third 
countries. A particular black spot on the record of general, traditional, sanctions regime, was 
the  Iraq  case,  where  the  same  persons  who  were  supposed  to  suffer  from  the  effects  of 
sanctions (i.e. the Baath regime) were in fact profiting from the Oil for Food Program. 
2 In order to minimize the general negative impact of country-directed sanctions, the 
UNSC developed “targeted sanctions” aimed directly at the elite and at specific individuals in 
problematic countries. The hope is that, by limiting these individuals' access to economic 
resources, travel and generally impeding their activities, they will be pressured into changing 
their  negative  behavior,  or  otherwise  lose  their  power  and  influence  in  their  respective 
countries. As a corollary, sanctions against legal persons and associations of persons were 
also imposed, as these are often useful vehicles for the transfer and concealment of economic 
resources. 
3  Targeted  sanctions  can  be  imposed  at  the  UNSC  level,  or,  in  the  case  of  the 
European Union (EU), also at the European level. EU targeted sanctions include all the UNSC 
ones, but sometimes go beyond those, both in terms of targets and the restrictions that they 
impose.  Generally,  UNSC  sanctions  involve  1)  asset  freezes;  2)  travel  restrictions;  3) 
restrictions on trade in certain goods; 4) restrictions in economic contacts with the targeted 
individuals and organizations. 
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4 The list of targets, as it stands today, can be broadly classified in A) individuals and 
organizations making up the governing elite in “problematic” countries (dictatorial regimes, 
regimes which promote international instability, regimes which flaunt international norms) 
(10  regimes)  and  B)  terrorists,  their  supporters  and  financiers  (3  regimes).  The  current 
sanctions regimes in place are enumerated in Table 1
1. 
Table 1. Situation of current sanctions regimes instituted by the UNSC 
No.  UNSC Resolution(s)  Scope of application 
1  751 (1992) 
1907 (2009) 
Eritrea and Somalia 
2  1267 (1999) 
1989 (2011) 
Any individual or entity associated with Al-Qaida 
3  1518 (2003)  Senior  officials  of  the  former  Iraqi  regime  and 
immediate family members, including entities owned or 
controlled by them or by persons acting on their behalf 
4  1521 (2003)  Liberia 
5  1533 (2004)  Democratic Republic of the Congo 
6  1572 (2004)  C￴te d'Ivoire 
7  1591 (2005)  The Sudan 
8  1636 (2005)  Individuals designated by the international independent 
investigation  Commission  or  the  Government  of 
Lebanon  as  suspected  of  involvement  in  the  14 
February  2005  terrorist  bombing  in  Beirut,  Lebanon 
that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri 
and 22 others
2 
9  1718 (2006)  Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
10  1737 (2006)  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  (in  particular  its  nuclear 
program) 
11  1970 (2011)  Libya (in particular the leaders of the Qaddafi regime) 
12  1988 (2011)  Any  individual,  group,  undertaking  and  entity 
designated  as  or  associated  with  the  Taliban  in 
constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security 
of Afghanistan 
13  2048 (2012)  Guinea-Bissau 
 
5 Each of these UNSC Resolutions provides that a specialized Committee, which is a 
subsidiary organ of the UNSC, designates individuals and entities to be included on lists of 
targeted sanctions. Some of the Resolutions provide exceptions (humanitarian or otherwise) 
from the general restrictions imposed on these individuals, others do not. The decision to list 
an individual or entity is a political one, taken according to the normal voting process of the 
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War Crimes Trials, OUP, Oxford, 2013, in particular Chapters 1 and 3. 
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UNSC. There is no previous communication with the potential “targets” and there is no direct 
means of judicial review of a listing, once it has been decided. 
6 At their introduction, targeted sanctions were hailed for their important advantages, 
such as 1) reduction of hardship and distress towards the general population of a country; 2) 
ability to be tailored to specific individuals, places, types of resources and types of travel; 3) 
immediacy of the UNSC's decisions, which sidesteps normal judicial procedures, and can list 
a  person  or  entity  based  on  any  kind  of  available  information;  4)  their  “temporary  and 
preventive” character, which leaves place for legal proceedings to take place in the normal 
criminal justice forums. 
7 Over time, a number of counter-arguments have been advanced, chief among which 
are 1) the lack of any judicial oversight of the listing and de-listing procedures; 2) the closed 
nature of the listing and de-listing debates, and the occasional use of confidential intelligence, 
leaving the targets with no means to make prove their innocence; 3) negative effects towards 
innocent third parties (such as co-owners of frozen assets); 4) the lack of humanitarian and 
other exceptions to the strict sanctions regimes. 
8 As the UNSC is immune from the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 
as well as that of regional or national courts, and there are no judicial mechanisms to review 
the legality of the sanctions regimes, there have been few options for the targeted persons and 
entities to challenge their listing in a meaningful and legally binding way. However, due to 
the fact that the sanctions regimes are to be implemented by the UN Members States, the 
targeted persons and individuals have been able to challenge the implementing measures in 
national and regional courts. 
9 Europe, and the EU, have arguably the most advanced regional system of human 
rights  protection,  which  is  guaranteed  mainly  by  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights 
(ECtHR) and, secondarily, by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). It is only natural that the 
most  resounding  legal  sagas  concerning  the  legality  of  sanctions  and  their  implementing 
measures have been played before these two international, regional, courts. As expected, the 
judicial solutions have not been able to please everyone, and have generally given priority to 
the protection of human rights over the UNSC Resolutions. However, it is arguable that these 
Courts have at the same time attempted to preserve the unity and harmony of the international 
normative system, by trying to find a “third way” which would reconcile the obligations of 
UN  Member  States  under  UNSC  Resolutions  with  their  obligations  under  human  rights 
treaties. 
10  This  article  attempts  to  provide  an  overview  of  (I)  the  functioning  of  UNSC 
sanctions regimes and their national implementation, including (IA) the procedure for listing 
and actual restrictions being imposed on the targeted individuals and entities and (IB) the 
procedure  for  de-listing  and  other  possible  challenges  to  listing;  following  which  it  will 
discuss the legal basis of the UNSC sanctions regimes (II), including the relationship between 
key UN Charter articles and general international law (IIA), finishing with the competing 
approaches that the regional courts have taken when assessing the legality of sanctions and 
their implementing measures (IIB). 
I Organization of UNSC Sanctions Regimes 
IA Listing and Restrictions 
11  Each  of  the  13  sanctions  regimes  provides  for  a  separate  listing  procedure. 
However,  they  are  organized  on  broadly  similar  lines.  Thus,  there  is  a  Security  Council 
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designation of individuals and entities as targets of the several sanctions
3. The Committees are 
invariably composed of representatives of the same Member States as those present in the 
UNSC itself, and change accordingly. These Committees are subsidiary organs of the UNSC 
and have individual Secretaries coordinated by an Officer-in-Charge. The voting procedure in 
the Committees is the same as in the UNSC, including the power of veto of the five 
Permanent Members
4. 
12 The types of sanctions taken against individuals and entities are summarized in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Types of sanctions taken against individuals and entities 
No.  Type of Sanctions  Description 
1  Arms Embargo  Targeted ban on arms transfers to individuals and entities (not 
to  be  confused  with  the  territorial  arms  embargo  usually 
imposed concurrently on the affected country). This usually 
includes  arms-related  materiel  of  all  types,  spare  parts, 
technical  advice,  assistance  or  training  related  to  military 
activities 
2  Travel Ban  Prevention of entry into or transit through the territories of 
Member States of the designated individuals 
3  Assets Freeze  Immediate  freezing  of  funds,  other  financial  assets  and 
economic  resources  owned  or  controlled,  directly  or 
indirectly, by the designated individuals and entities 
4  Ban  on  the  export  of 
luxury goods 
A territorial ban on the DPRK which, due to the particular 
situation  in  the  country,  acts  as  a  targeted  ban  –  only  the 
regime has access to luxury goods 
5  Ban on the provision of 
financial services or the 
transfer  of  financial  or 
other assets 
A ban imposed against the financial institutions of the DPRK 
which are presumed to contribute to prohibited programs or 
activities, or to the evasion of sanctions 
 
Additionally, there are country-specific measures such as a Charcoal Ban for Somalia, 
a nuclear-related spare parts ban for Iran, or a Diamonds Ban for the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), which aim to prevent the value of these resources from accruing, through 
export or import, to the perpetrators of violence or elites of the local regimes. Out of these, the 
most immediately damaging and problematic bans are 1) Travel Bans and 2) Assets Freezes. 
It is these types of sanctions which concern the present article, since they directly concern 
individuals  and  private  entities  and  can  potentially  create  situations  of  human  rights 
violations. 
13 The voting procedure takes place individually, for each person or entity designated, 
as well as for every type of sanction. Thus, there can be individuals subjected only to travel 
bans,  while  others  are  subjected  both  to  travel  bans  and  asset  freezes  within  the  same 
sanctions regime. Some of the UNSC Resolutions have instituted criteria for listing. A more 
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developed example is that concerning the DRC, which provides that there shall be designated 
by the Sanctions Committee 
“1)  persons and entities acting in violation of the arms embargo; 
2)  political and military leaders of foreign armed groups operating in the DRC, or 
Congolese militias receiving support from abroad, who impede the process of 
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration; 
3)  political and military leaders recruiting or using child-soldiers, and individuals 
violating international law involving the targeting of children; 
4)  individuals  operating  in  the  DRC  and  committing  serious  violations  of 
international law involving the targeting of children or women in situations of 
armed conflict, including killing and maiming, sexual violence, abduction and 
forced displacement; 
5)  individuals  obstructing  the  access  to  or  the  distribution  of  humanitarian 
assistance in the eastern part of the DRC; 
6)  individuals or entities supporting the illegal armed Groups in the eastern part 
of  the  DRC  through  the  illicit  trade  of  natural  resources,  including  as  a 
consequence of not having exercised due diligence consistent with the steps set 
out in Resolution 1952 (2010).” 
However, it should be noted that the majority of UNSC Sactions Resolutions do not 
provide for such criteria, nor have the relevant Committees produced such criteria themselves. 
14 Quite apart from the general criteria for listing an individual or an entity are the 
actual reasons given for the listing. Here, one must take into account the UNSC's view that 
targeted sanctions are a temporary and preventive measure, and therefore, they are not to be 
subjected  to  the  same  high  standards  of  proof  as  normal  criminal  judicial  proceedings. 
Therefore, the UNSC has in practice provided very little information on why a particular 
person or entity has been listed. The sources of such information vary widely: from BBC 
reports to confidential intelligence, everything is included and summed up in a few phrases. 
Sometimes, the reasons being given are very general to the point of being no reasons at all. A 
few examples are illustrated in Table 3. 
Table 3. Different examples of reasons for listing 
Extensive, reasoned listing  „Hassan  Dahir Aweys  has  acted  and  continues  to  act  as  a 
senior political and ideological leader of a variety of armed 
opposition groups responsible for repeated violations of the 
general and complete arms embargo and / or acts that threaten 
the  Djibouti  peace  agreement,  the  Transitional  Federal 
Government  (TFG)  and  the  African  Union  Mission  in 
Somalia  (AMISOM)  forces.  Between  June  2006  and 
September 2007, AWEYSs served as chairman of the central 
committee  of  the  Islamic  Courts  Union;  in  July  2008  he 
declared  himself  chairman  of  the  Alliance  for  the  Re-
Liberation of Somalia-Asmara wing; and in May 2009 he was 
named chairman of the Hisbul Islam, an alliance of groups 
opposed  to  the TFG.  In  each  of  these  positions, AWEYS's 
statements and actions have demonstrated an unequivocal and 
sustained intention to dismantle the TFG and expel AMISOM 
by force from Somalia
5.” 
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Short, reasoned listing  “Ibrahim.  Hassan,  Tali,  Al-Asiri;  Operative  and  principal 
bomb maker of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 
Believed to be hiding in Yemen as at Mar. 2011. Wanted by 
Saudi Arabia. INTERPOL Orange Notice has been issued for 
him. Also associated with Nasir 'abd-al-Karim 'Abdullah Al-
Wahishi, Said Ali al-Shihri, Qasim Yahya Mahdi al-Rimi, and 
Anwar Nasser Abdulla Al-Aulaqi
6.” 
Short, basic reasoning  “Said Jan, 'Abd Al-Salam; In approximately 2005, he ran a 
“basic training” camp for Al-Qaida in Pakistan
7.” 
 
15 Usually, only one or a few of the UNSC Member States have the particular details 
regarding a specific individual, and they only share them (if at all) within the closed confines 
of the specialized Committee. These details do not make it onto the public lists. Member 
States invoke the potential negative effects that more details would have on their sources and 
operatives on the ground. What is clear, however, is that the standard of reasoning for listing 
is  very  much  lower  than  that  for  a  judicial  criminal  action.  Furthermore,  the  allegations 
contained in the lists do not have to be materially proven before the Committees, since the 
listing procedure is political, rather than judicial. 
16 The UNSC Resolutions are addressed to Member States. The typical language for a 
Travel Ban reads as follows: 
“1. Decides that all Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the 
entry  into  or  transit  through  their  territories  of  individuals  designated  by  the  Committee 
pursuant to paragraph 8 below, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to 
refuse its own nationals entry into its territory
8.” 
The typical language for an Asset Freeze reads as follows: 
“3. Decides that all Member States shall freeze without delay the funds, other financial 
assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, 
directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities designated by the Committee pursuant to 
paragraph 8 below, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or 
by entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and decides further 
that all Member States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are 
prevented  from  being  made  available  by  their  nationals  or  by  any  individuals  or  entities 
within their territories, to or for the benefit of such individuals or entities
9;” 
While the Travel Ban obligations are naturally implemented by the Member States 
through their organs, border protection and regulation being a traditional attribution of state 
institutions, the Asset Freeze obligations cannot be directly acted upon by the Member States, 
in the context of a market economy where private property is the main form of economic 
ownership of assets. In other words, the State needs the private sector to actually freeze assets 
and prevent their use by the designated individuals and entities. To this end, the State has two 
options:  1)  make  the  UNSC  Resolutions  directly  applicable  within  its  legal  system,  thus 
obliging  the  relevant  private  actors  to  apply  them  directly;  or  2)  implement  the  UNSC 
Resolutions through national legal rules. In the context of the EU, where Member States have 
pooled  the  decision-making  process  concerning  targeted  sanctions  at  the  European  level 
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7 Idem. 
8  UNSC  Resolution  1844  (2008)  concerning  Somalia,  para.  1.  Available  at: 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1844(2008)  
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(specifically, within the Council of the EU), without, however, renouncing their sovereign 
rights on the matter, the relevant implementation measures are those taken at EU level. The 
private sector, being deemed to know national law, is responsible for its application. The 
second option is taken by most states. Furthermore, several states, including Romania, have 
established  specialized  institutions  to  deal  with  the  imposition  of  Asset  Freezes  and  its 
practicalities. 
17 Some UNSC Resolutions provide for exemptions from the restrictions. Regarding 
the restrictions against individuals, the exemptions generally have a humanitarian nature. The 
typical language for a Travel Ban exemption reads as follows: 
“2. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above shall not apply: 
(a)  where  the  Committee  determines  on  a  case-by-case  basis  that  such  travel  is 
justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation; or 
(b) where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that an exemption would 
otherwise further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in Somalia and stability 
in the region
10;” 
Typical language for an Asset Freeze exemption reads as follows: 
“4. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 3 above do not apply to funds, 
other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant Member 
States: 
(a)  to  be  necessary  for  basic  expenses,  including  payment  for  foodstuffs,  rent  or 
mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility 
charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional  fees and reimbursement of 
incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, in 
accordance with  national  laws,  for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other 
financial  assets  and  economic  resources,  after  notification  by  the  relevant  State  to  the 
Committee  of  the  intention  to  authorize,  where  appropriate,  access  to  such  funds,  other 
financial  assets  or  economic  resources,  and  in  the  absence  of  a  negative  decision  by  the 
Committee within three working days of such notification; 
(b) to be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has 
been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee and has been approved 
by the Committee; or 
(c) to be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in which 
case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien 
or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered into prior to the date of the 
present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 
3 above, and has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee; 
5.Decides that Member States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant 
to the provisions of paragraph 3 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or 
payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which 
those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such 
interest,  other  earnings  and  payments  continue  to  be  subject  to  these  provisions  and  are 
frozen
11;” 
18 A few important circumstances may be identified from the texts above. Firstly, the 
UNSC, through the Committees, has monopolized the decision-making process regarding the 
Asset Freeze and Travel Bans. In practice, with the exception of basic expenses and legal 
services, any other expense of a targeted individual or entity must be approved in advance by 
the Committee. In other words, each individual must apply, through the relevant State, to an 
obscure international body who decides, politically and without recourse, on whether he or 
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she may incur a certain expense or make a certain trip. Secondly, regarding travel, practically 
the targeted individuals are “frozen” on the spot they found themselves on the date of their 
listing, since no country is allowed to let them “enter into or transit through” its territory, and 
this presumably includes transit through international airports. Even if the country where they 
are found is not their country of citizenship, unless the two are contiguous, it is hard to see 
how such a person would be able to return to their country of citizenship. Thirdly, these 
sanctions  have  no  automatic  time  limitation,  even  though  several  commentators  have 
proposed “sunset clauses”, i.e. the automatic lapse of sanctions after a period of time if they 
are  not  renewed.  All  these  circumstances  transform  the  sanctions  into  a  harsh  form  of 
punishment taken without a judicial process. 
IB De-listing and Challenges to Listing 
19 In principle, a listing should be a temporary and preventive measure, designed to 
impede the escalation of conflict, or the actions of a particularly important person, and thus 
determine  this  person  to  stop  perpetrating  acts  against  international  peace  and  security. 
Therefore,  the  UNSC  sanctions  Resolutions  provide  for  means  of  de-listing  individuals 
designated by the specialized Committees. The typical language for such a provision is: 
“9. Decides that the measures outlined in paragraphs 1, 3 and 7 above cease to apply in 
respect of such individuals or entities if, and at such time as the Committee removes them 
from the list of designated individuals and entities
12;” 
Until 2006, there was no direct means for an individual or entity to apply for de-listing 
to the relevant Specialized Committee. They had to apply to the individual state where they 
were found, or to  their state of citizenship, and, after a review process,  that state  would 
forward the request to the Committee for consideration. This procedure was obviously not 
expedient, and it was also finally subject to the same constraints as any other decision of the 
UNSC – its peculiar rules of voting, which meant that even one negative vote by a Permanent 
Member would impede any de-listing. 
20 In 2006, the UNSC established through Resolution 1730 (2006) a Focal Point for 
De-listing, “as part of its commitment to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing 
individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them, as well as for granting 
humanitarian exemptions
13.” Currently, a targeted person may ask for de-listing through either 
their State of Citizenship or State of Residence, or through the Focal Point
14. The Focal Point 
consults with the two relevant states, as well as with the Requesting State (the one which 
requested the listing in the first place), and, if these states oppose the de -listing or give no 
reply, with the other members of the relevant Committee. If even  one member of the 
Committee proposes de-listing, providing the reasons thereof, the Chairman circulates this 
proposal under the No Opposition rule, meaning that the individual or entity is de -listed 
unless the Committee opposes the request. Thus, the procedure is reversed, leading to a high 
number of de-listing in the past seven years (13 individuals out of 54 requests). 
21 The Focal Point does not have competence to deal with de-listing requests from the 
Al-Qaida Sanctions List. The reasons are that 1) the Al-Qaida Sanctions list is in a class of its 
own, concerning a non-state entity with a global presence; 2) it is by far the longest list in the 
targeted sanctions system; and 3) it affects quite a lot of persons indirectly, including family 
members, co-owners of assets under the control or ownership of listed persons; and 4) it 
sometimes affects persons with no link to Al -Qaida, due to some wrong listings. For this 
particular list, the UNSC through Resolution 1904 (2009) has established the Office of the 
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Ombudsperson. This “independent and impartial” Ombudsperson, appointed by the Secretary-
General, “is mandated to gather information and to interact with the petitioner, relevant states 
and  organizations  with  regard  to  the  request.  Within  an  established  time  frame,  the 
Ombudsperson will then present a comprehensive report to the Sanctions Committee. Based 
on an analysis of all available information and the Ombudsperson's observations, the report 
will  set  out  for  the  Committee  the  principal  arguments  concerning  the  specific  delisting 
request.  The  report  will  also  contain  a  recommendation  from  the  Ombudsperson  on  the 
delisting  request.  Where  the  Ombudsperson  recommends  that  the  Committee  consider 
delisting,  the  individual  or  entity  will  be  delisted  unless,  within  60  days,  the  Committee 
decides by consensus to maintain the listing. However, if there is no such consensus, during 
that 60 day period a Committee member may request the matter be referred to the Security 
Council for a decision on the question of whether to delist
15.” 
22  The  Office  of  the  Ombudsperson  has  made  some  significant  steps  towards 
transforming the de-listing process into a more open and impartial activity. For example, it 
has  adopted  a  Standard  for  Analysis,  Observations,  Principal  Arguments,  and 
Recommendation, as well as an Approach to Assessment of Information alleged to have been 
obtained  by  Torture,  and  procedures  for  access  to  confidential  or  classified  information. 
Currently, there are 49 Cases on the roster of the Ombudsperson. Out of these, 27 have been 
solved through de-listing, 3 were denied de-listing, one each have been amended or retracted 
by the petitioner and the rest are still under consideration. The Cases concern one or more 
individuals each, and one or more entities. 
23  Even  though  the  Ombudsperson  has  taken  significant  measures  to  ensure  that 
individuals  have  an  easy  access  to  its  procedures,  the  final  decision  regarding  de-listing 
remains with the 1267 Committee, and the UNSC. Therefore, in essence, it remains a political 
process.  While  the  Ombudsperson  is  a  public  attorney  of  a  sort  (in  the  absence  of  any 
procedure  for  the  Committee  to  listen  to  the  listed  persons  directly),  the  Committee  is 
certainly not a court of law. 
24  The  options  available  to  listed  individuals  and  entities  are  indeed  limited.  The 
Committees, and the UNSC, are immune from legal suits according to public international 
law  at  large.  The  International  Court  of  Justice  may  not  hear  individual  petitioners.  The 
Human Rights Committee established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights  does  not  have  direct  jurisdiction  since  the  United  Nations  is  not  a  party  to  the 
Covenant. The United Nations Administrative Tribunal does not have jurisdiction  ratione 
materiae. And, of course, the United Nations has legal immunity from suits in regional or 
national courts. Therefore, as far as direct actions by the listed individuals are concerned, they 
have no options. 
25 Supposing that a certain state would like to exercise diplomatic protection and take 
up their case, it would be similarly limited in its options. Thus, the International Court of 
Justice would not have direct and compulsory jurisdiction, since the UN is not a state. Only 
through  a  concerted  action,  such  as  a  request  for  an  Advisory  Opinion  from  the  ICJ, 
presumably addressed through the General Assembly, would the question of the legality of 
targeted sanctions be put to the “judicial organ of the United Nations.” Such a request is not 
forthcoming. 
26 The only opening available to individual petitioners, for a judicial review of their 
sanctions regime, is therefore to be found at the national and regional level. At this point, two 
potential “targets” of review present themselves, namely 1) the UNSC Resolution instituting 
sanctions itself; and 2) the implementing measures taken by the Member State. The interplay 
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between these two, and the court's approach to such judicial actions is presented in the second 
part of this article. 
II UNSC Sanctions Regime and International Law 
IIA Conflicting Obligations of Member States 
27 According to  Article 24(1) of the United Nations  Charter  (UNC), the Security 
Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
After a determination under Article 39 that a situation constitutes a threat to, or breach of the 
peace, the UNSC can order states to undertake provisional measures under Article 40, non-
forcible measures under Article 41 – normally referred to as sanctions – and finally, military 
action under Article 42, against the entity responsible for the threat or breach. The UNSC 
seldom states explicitly on which article it is basing its resolution, but confines itself to saying 
that it is  “acting under  Chapter VII of the Charter
16.” Once a Resolution is adopted, the 
measures contained in it must be implemented by the Member States exactly as stated in it – 
there is no margin of appreciation unless the Resolution says so. There might be a margin of 
appreciation or at least the possibility of influencing the listing of a person, i.e. before the 
Resolution takes effect against the listed individual, but this issue will be dealt with later. In 
any case, once a person is listed, the Member State has only three things to do: 1) implement 
the Resolution exactly; 2) receive and recommend action on any de-listing request; and 3) 
possibly act within the margin of appreciation left by the wording of the Resolution. 
28 Under article 103 UNC, “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any 
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” The 
text is very clear that anything contained in the UNC prevails over any other obligation of a 
Member State. It has been generally interpreted to apply also to any obligation arising out of a 
decision taken according to the Charter, such as a Chapter VII Resolution of the UNSC
17. A 
problem appears in the case of Member States which have assumed international obligations 
with respect to human rights, especially ones which impose  procedural rights, such as the 
right to a fair hearing. Because, in this case, even though the underlying material right may be 
derogated from (e.g. the right to travel), the derogatory measure would still be a violation of 
human rights if it was taken without appropriate procedural safeguards. 
29  Exactly  such  a  situation  arises  regarding  the  State  Parties  to  the  European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)
18, and even more so regarding the Member State s of 
the EU. Article 6 of the ECHR provides for the “Right to a fair trial” while Article 8 protects 
private  and  family  life,  and  Article  13  guarantees  the  “Right  to  an  effective  remedy.” 
Concurrently, in the EU, human rights are protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the  European  Union,  which  has  the  same  legal  value  as  the  Treaties
19, in respect of the 
validity, interpretation and application of EU legal measures. At the same time, “fundamental 
rights, as they are guaranteed through the ECHR and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to Member States, are general principles of the Union law
20.” Suffice it to 
                                                 
16  Iain  Cameron,  Targeted  Sanctions  and  Legal  Safeguards,  Uppsala  University  Working  Paper,  available  here: 
http://pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/96/96817_sanctions.pdf at p. 5.  
17 Jean-Pierre Cot, Alain Pellet, La Charte des Nations Unies, Commentaire article par article, 3
rd Edition, Economica, Paris, 
p. 2133 et seq. 
18 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its additional Protocols, available here: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf  
19 Treaty on the European Union, Article 6(1). 
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say that the Charter has grown on the ECtHR developments and fully provides for the same 
and other human rights. 
30 Finally, every UN Member State is also bound by customary law, including the 
norms of jus cogens. Inasmuch as such norms protect human rights, it is argued that they 
would supersede even Article 103 UNC, since their effect voids even preexisting law which 
runs contrary to their tenets. It is, however, fairly hard to find rules of jus cogens which would 
apply in our situation. 
31  The  direct  effect  of  UNC  provisions  within  the  national  legal  systems  are 
debatable, as are those of UNSC Resolutions
21, even though their binding and superior legal 
power is not. Therefore, Member States have chosen to repeat the provisions of the targeted 
sanctions  Resolutions  in  national  law,  through  corresponding  legal  instruments  (Laws, 
Orders, Government Decisions etc.), which have unquestionable direct effect in national law 
and are also practically more accessible to their intended recipients (mainly the financial and 
legal  services  sectors).  However,  this  opens  a  wedge  between  the  international  legal 
obligations of the Member States  and the obligations imposed on national natural and legal 
persons by the same States. It is a wedge in which the State can find itself squeezed. 
32 In the EU, the decision-making power with regard to targeted sanctions has been 
taken to the European level, in a consensus procedure, which means that every Member State 
has a power of veto over the proposed measures. However, it is important to note that, at the 
same time, every state has an obligation under Article 48 UNC, to apply the UNSC decisions 
both directly, as well as through their actions in the relevant international organizations where 
they are members. This obligation is not imposed on international organizations or organs per 
se, but it imposes on Member States a positive duty of action which should be taken into 
account  in  order  to  engage  their  own  responsibility,  if  the  organization  adopts  measures 
incompatible with the UNSC decisions, provided that these measures would not have been 
possible without the active or passive contribution of the relevant Member State
22. Therefore, 
the Member States reunited in the EU Council only have a measure of discretion if either 1) 
the UNSC Resolution allows one; or 2) for the targeted sanctions imposed by the EU outside 
of the UNSC framework.  
33 From the formal point of view, EU decisions concerning targeted sanctions are 
Council  Regulations  or  Council  Decisions.  These  instruments  have  clear  direct  effect 
according to the Treaties, and therefore do not require further transposition by the EU 
Member States. In this situation, therefore, it is the EU which creates a wedge between the 
international obligation of Member States according to UNSC Resolutions and the obligations 
imposed on their nationals, and chooses to place itself in this wedge by taking the decision -
making process off states' hands, at least formally. 
33 Every Party to the ECHR, and by implication every EU Member State has a system 
whereby legal rules, as well as individual decisions, issued by state organs, may be challenged 
in a court of law. The challenge must be effective, so as to guarantee a remedy that makes the 
person good on any damage suffered as a result of an unlawful rule or decision. The ECtHR 
guarantees this right, as well as the procedural right of due process and fair hearing, and there 
is a direct action against the state available to anyone being “under its jurisdiction,” under the 
condition  that  national  legal  remedies  have  been  exhausted.  At  the  EU  level,  the  ECJ is 
empowered to verify the validity and legality of EU measures, including Council Regulations 
and Decisions, in the area of targeted sanctions. 
34  As  indicated  above,  the  international  organizations  themselves  are  not  directly 
obliged  to  follow  UNSC  Resolutions.  On  the  contrary,  they  must  also  follow  their  own 
fundamental instruments, namely the ECHR in the case of the ECtHR, and the EU Treaties in 
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the case of the ECJ. Both these courts have a respectable record of judicial reasoning and 
judicial activism, whereby they have consolidated the respective power of their fundamental 
instruments in the legal orders of the Member States. From the formal point of view, these 
fundamental  instruments are treaties,  thus  instruments  instituting international  obligations. 
Read through the perspective of Article 103 UNC, they would all have secondary status as 
opposed to Charter obligations. The conclusion is not the same if read through the prism of 
the European treaties themselves. 
35 This point has not been lost on individual applicants seeking to challenge their 
UNSC listing. Left without any direct challenge against the Resolutions themselves, they have 
challenged the national or EU norms which “translated” with direct effect the relevant UNSC 
sanctions lists, both on substantive grounds (i.e. for negating their freedom of movement or 
their right to property), as well as on procedural grounds (i.e. the lack of a judicial process and 
effective  guarantees  when  the  measures  were  imposed).  Faced  with  these  challenges,  for 
which the ECJ and ECtHR have, respectively, a clear jurisdiction ratione materiae, the courts 
could have taken one of the following courses of action: 
A Affirm that the challenge has actually been made against the UNSC Resolutions, 
and therefore that they have no jurisdiction to annul a norm not issued by the EU or Member 
States; 
B Affirm that, when adopting the implementing rules, the Member States have no 
margin of appreciation, and therefore that these rules cannot be annulled because that would 
go against a superior international obligation of the state; 
C Affirm that, when adopting the implementing rules, the Member States do have 
some  margin  of  appreciation,  and  therefore  they  should  have  implemented  the  UNSC 
Resolutions in a manner consistent with the rights guaranteed to individual applicants under 
the ECHR and EU Treaties. Further make an inquiry whether these rights have been respected 
at either the UN, or EU, or national level, and if the answer is in the negative, annul the 
implementing measure; 
D Affirm that UNC obligations are inferior to jus cogens norms, and check whether 
the  obligations  imposed  by  the  UNSC  Resolutions  are  contrary  to  these  norms,  thus 
“discovering” and indirect basis of jurisdiction over UNSC Resolutions, and if the answer is 
in the positive, annul the implementing measure. 
As seen above, in two of the four approaches, the Member States and the EU run the 
risk  that  their  implementing  measures  are  annulled,  while  leaving  their  international 
obligation under UNC standing. In other words, because of the compulsory nature of ECtHR 
and  ECJ  decisions,  the  states  would  have  no  power  to  execute  their  UNSC  obligations 
internally, while not being able to use this as a valid excuse towards the UN. 
36 This is exactly what has happened in the several cases analyzed below, in the final 
part of this article. 
IIB Judicial Antagonism or Legal Dialogue 
37 For the present article, I have chosen the main judgments issued by the ECtHR and 
the ECJ in the matter of targeted sanctions, which have created valid precedents and have 
illustrated the approaches taken by these courts to analyzing the validity of implementing 
measures and, some would say, of the UNSC Resolutions themselves. These are Kadi I
23 and 
II
24 for the ECJ, and Nada
25 and Al-Dulimi
26 for the ECtHR. 
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38 Kadi I concerned a listing made against Mr. Yasin Abdullah Ezzedine al-Qadi 
(Kadi) by the Committee established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999), regarding 
the Taliban and Al-Qaida. This listing was “transplanted” into EU law by Council Regulation 
881/2002
27. As a result, a travel ban and asset freeze were  imposed on Mr Kadi, who 
challenged the Regulation before the Court of First Instance (CFI). The CFI rejected his 
application, reasoning that “that obligation of the Member States to respect the principle of 
the primacy of obligations  undertaken by virtue of the [UNC] is  not affected by the EC 
Treaty, for it is an obligation arising from an agreement concluded before the Treaty, and so 
falling within the scope of Article 307 EC
28.” The CFI further considered that “in so far as 
under the EC Treaty the Community has assumed powers previously exercised by Member 
States in the area governed by the [UNC], the provisions of that Charter have the effect of 
binding the Community
29.” The CFI also found that, while in normal circumstances, every act 
of the Member States or of the Community itself must be subject to judicial review, there may 
be “structural limitations” to this review, which limit its scope. In the case, given that “the 
Community acted, […], under the circumscribed powers leaving it no autonomous discretion 
in  their  exercise,  so  that  it  could,  in  particular,  neither  directly  alter  the  content  of  the 
resolutions at issue nor set up any mechanism capable of giving rise to such alteration
30,” Mr 
Kadi's challenge was actually targeted at the UNSC Resolution. Such a Resolution could not 
be challenged except as with regard to the norms of jus cogens, which were found not to have 
been disregarded by the UNSC, as “measured by the standard of universal protection of the 
fundamental rights of the human person covered by jus cogens
31.” On the other hand, the CFI 
found  that  it  is  not  competent  “to  review  indirectly  whether  the  [UNSC]'s  resolutions  in 
question are themselves compatible with fundamental rights as protected by the Community 
legal order
32,” nor “to verify that there has been no error of assessment of the facts  and 
evidence relied on by the [UNSC] in support of the measures it has taken or, […] to check 
indirectly the appropriateness and proportionality of those measures. It would be impossible 
to carry out such a check without trespassing on the Security Council's prerogatives under 
Chapter VII of the [UNC]
33.” Compared with the approaches presented at para. 35 above, the 
CFI adopted both B and D, in an interesting way. On the one hand, it rejected the application, 
finding that the Community legal order is not superior to the UNC obligations, and that the 
UNSC  is  independent  in  its  application  of  the  UNC.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  it 
established a right for the ECJ to review UNSC Resolutions, where they would conflict with 
jus cogens norms. Finally, it also affirmed that jus cogens norms, at that point in time, did not 
cover any obligation of access to a fair hearing before being targeted by an asset freeze or 
travel ban, which is an important situation of opinio juris being expressed on the matter. 
39 Mr Kadi appealed the decision to the General Court, and asked for the CFI decision 
to be overturned, along with the annulment of the contested Regulation. The General Court 
(GC) proceeded to affirm the supremacy of human rights as a condition of legality for any act 
of the Community, and in particular the special role played by the ECHR in that assessment. 
Then, it denied the right of any EU institution to review the legality of UNSC Resolutions, 
even  with  the  norms  of  jus  cogens
34.  Any  such  review  must  be  directed  only  at  the 
Community measure which gives effect to the Resolution. It then goes on to affirm that “any 
                                                                                                                                                         
26 Case of Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. V Switzerland (Application no. 5809/08), Judgment of 26 November 
2013. 
27 Adopted on the basis of Articles 60, 301 and 308 EC, currently Articles 75, 215 and 352 TFEU. 
28 Kadi I, para. 75. Article 307 EC is now Article 351 TFEU. 
29 Kadi I, para. 79. 
30 Kadi I, para. 84. 
31 Kadi I, para. 90. 
32 Kadi I, para. 104, at 283. 
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judgment given by the Community judicature deciding that a Community measure intended to 
give effect to such a resolution is contrary to a higher rule of law in the Community legal 
order would not entail any challenge to the primacy of that resolution in international law
35.” 
I  would  posit  that,  while  the  GC  statement  is  valid  in  that  the  resolution's  validity  and 
supremacy in international law is not affected, it is, at the same time, left without any means 
of application at the Community and national level, thus placing the Member States in a 
situation where they cannot fulfill one of their international obligations. In other words, with 
this statement, the GC opens the way to a type C approach, where it is ready to throw the state 
in  the  wedge  between  international  obligations  and  the  impossibility  to  implement  them 
nationally. 
The  GC  goes  on  to  strike  another  blow  to  the  supremacy  of  UNSC  Resolutions, 
affirming  that  “by  virtue  of  that  provision  [i.e.  Article  300(7)  EC],  supposing  it  to  be 
applicable to the [UNC], the latter would have primacy over acts of secondary Community 
law. That primacy at the level of Community law would not, however, extend to primary law, 
in particular to the general principles of which fundamental rights form part
36.” This is a very 
important statement. Although apparently the GC conserves the Article 103 UNC obligations, 
it does so on different lines than the CFI. Thus, if the CFI adopted an direct approach, saying 
that,  in  and  of  itself,  the  UNC  imposes  on  the  Community  its  obligations,  because  the 
attributions of the Member States in relation to implementing UNC cannot be taken at the 
Community level without their corresponding obligations, the GC states that, within the EU 
legal order, the hierarchy of norms is stated by the Treaties, and thus it is the Treaties which 
confer, in a limited and circumvented way, a legal power to UNSC Resolutions. 
Going further, the GC analyzes summarily whether the contested Regulation would be 
attributable to the UNSC itself, and finds that it cannot be so. This is in quite some contrast 
with  a  prima  facie  reading  of  the  Draft  Articles  on  the  Responsibility  of  International 
Organisations  (DARIO), and in  particular Article 15 which provides that  an international 
organization which directs and controls another international organization in the commission 
of an internationally wrongful act by the latter organization is internationally responsible for 
that act if (a) the former organization does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the 
internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed 
by that organization. On the other hand, it is an explainable approach, because, in order to 
give effect to the judicial guarantees provided for by the EU Treaties, the GC must insulate 
them from the UNC, so as not to be seen as attacking in any way the UNSC. 
At this point in the Kadi I decision, the GC takes an opportunity for a sort of “judicial 
dialogue” with the Member States and the UNSC. It creates a “test” to see whether the UNSC 
procedure offers the required procedural guarantees which would be similar or equivalent to 
the judicial guarantees offered by the EU
37. Of course, given the political nature of the UNSC 
decision process, it finds that such a system does not exist. On the other hand, by proposing 
such a test it sends the message that, if and when the UNSC will adopt a listing and de-listing 
procedure which would offer equivalent guarantees, such a procedure would be recognized 
and given effect at the European level. It is, thus, a form of judicial encouragement towards 
the reform of the UNSC. 
40 In the final part of t he  Kadi  I  decision
38, the GC looks at ways in which the 
procedural guarantees under EU law must be respected. In this regard, it says that, in order for 
Mr Kadi to refute the accusations made against him, he should have been communicated the 
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grounds  on  which  the  name  of  a  person  or  entity  is  listed.  On  the  other  hand,  this 
communication does not need to be done immediately, since the “surprise effect” of the listing 
would be jeopardized, but at least once the claimant wishes to refute the allegations. Such a 
communication is also necessary for the GC, because otherwise it cannot “do other than find 
that it is not able to undertake the review of the lawfulness of the contested regulation in so 
far as it concerns the appellants, with the result that it must be held that, for that reason too, 
the  fundamental  right  to  an  effective  legal  remedy  which  they  enjoy  has  not,  in  the 
circumstances, been observed
39.” For the same reasons the GC finds that Mr Kadi's right to 
respect for property has been infringed, since, even though the asset freeze measures might in 
principle be justified (here the GC summarizes the ECtHR jurisprudence in the matter) and 
proportional, the lack of any reasoning or imposing it makes it intrinsically infringing
40. Thus, 
the GC annuls the contested Regulation in respect of Mr Kadi. 
41 Kadi II was rendered on the 18
th of July 2013, and its contents and effects have not 
yet been fully analyzed by the doctrine. It is the second part of the Kadi legal saga, and starts 
off where Kadi I left it. Thus, after the Kadi I decision, on 21 October 2008, the Chairman of 
the 1267 Sanctions Committee communicated the narrative summary of reasons for Mr Kadi's 
listin on that committee's Consolidated List to France's Permanent Representative to the UN, 
and authorized its transmission to Mr Kadi
41, while also publishing it on the website of the 
Sanctions Committee. France sent it to the European Commission, which sent it to Mr Kadi, 
informing him that for the reasons set out there, it envisaged maintaining his listing according 
to Regulation no. 881/2002, also providing him with a period for comment, which Mr Kadi 
used to mount a defense, based on the lack of criminal charges brought against him in several 
countries, and drawing attention to the vagueness and generali ty of a number of allegations 
contained in the summary of reasons
42. The Commission still adopted the Regulation. 
Mr Kadi made an appeal to the GC for annulment of the Regulation. The GC took up 
the arguments presented in  Kadi I while also analyzing the effect of the communication of 
reasons on their application. The GC observed that “those rights had been respected only in a 
purely formal and superficial sense, since the Commission considered itself strictly bound by 
the findings of the Sanctions Committee and at no time envisaged calling them into question 
in  the  light  of  Mr  Kadi's  comments  or  making  any  real  effort  to  refute  the  exculpatory 
evidence  adduced  by  Mr  Kadi;  and  […]  the  few  pieces  of  information  and  the  vague 
allegations in the summary of reasons […] were clearly insufficient to enable Mr Kadi to 
mount an effective challenge to the allegations against him
43.” After applying the same test as 
shown above at para. 39, the GC found that the judicial standards guaranteed by the EU have 
not been met, and therefore annulled the Regulation. One extra point made by the GC was 
that the asset freeze was, given its general application and duration (almost a decade at the 
time),  a  significant  restriction  on  his  right  of  property  which  was  not  proportional  to  its 
purpose. The Commission and the Council appealed this ruling. 
42 The Grand Chamber of the ECJ (the Chamber) reaffirmed the reasoning of the GC 
in  Kadi  I,  saying  that  “without  the  primacy  of  a  Security  Council  resolution  at  the 
international  level  thereby  being  called  into  question,  the  requirement  that  the  European 
Union institutions should pay due regard to the institutions of the United Nations must not 
result in there being no review of the lawfulness of such European Union measures, in the 
light of the fundamental rights which are an integral part of the general principles of European 
Union law
44.” Thus, the wedge posited above was thoroughly consolidated. 
                                                 
39 Kadi I, para. 351. 
40 Kadi I, para. 371. 
41 Kadi II, para. 27. 
42 Kadi II, para. 29-31. 
43 Kadi II, para. 43. 
44 Kadi II, para. 67. Ioan-Luca VLAD   435 
 
Here, the Chamber engages in another round of “judicial dialogue,” this time with 
regard to the apparent impossibility of Member States and the Council to respect their EU law 
obligation  to  provide  adequate  reasons  for  listing.  After  repeating  the  unchallenged  facts 
regarding the listing procedure (explained, in summary, in part I of this article), the Chamber 
imposes  a  new  obligation  on  the  Member  States,  thusly:  “In  that  context,  it  is  for  that 
authority  to  assess,  having  regard,  inter  alia,  to  the  content  of  any  such  comments  [i.e. 
comments made by the listed person], whether it is necessary to seek the assistance of the 
Sanctions Committee and, through that committee, the Member of the UN which proposed 
the listing of the individual  concerned on that committee's  Consolidated  List, in  order to 
obtain, in that spirit of effective cooperation which, under Article 220(1) TFEU, must govern 
relations  between  the  Union  and  the  organs  of  the  United  Nations  in  the  fight  against 
international  terrorism,  the  disclosure  of  information  or  evidence,  confidential  or  not,  to 
enable it to discharge its duty of careful and impartial examination
45.” And further, “it is for 
the Courts of the European Union, in order to carry out that examination [i.e. on the merits of 
the listing], to request the competent European Union authority, when necessary, to produce 
information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an examination
46.” This is based 
on the burden of proof being on the accuser, i.e. the UNSC Resolution cannot reverse the 
burden of proof to the accused, in order to impose on him an obligation to adduce negative 
evidence. 
What happens if the European Union is unsuccessful in its attempts to obtain more 
information? The Chamber says that the Union itself might provide similar information, in 
order to establish the well-founded nature of the listing. If neither of these happens, then the 
listing must be annulled
47. If, also, the information is confidential or sensitive, the Courts of 
the  European  Union  are  prepared  to  consider  alternative  disclosure  methods,  such  as 
summaries, or in camera proceedings. Finally, the Chamber imposes a de minimis condition 
on the validity of the listing – i.e. out of all the reasons invoked for it, if even only one is 
valid,  then  the  listing  must  stand,  given  its  preventive  nature
48.  After  making  several 
determinations of factual errors on the part of the GC, the Chamber dismisses the appeals and 
maintains the obligation to de-list Mr Kadi from the contested Regulation. 
43 The ECJ placed the European Union and, more importantly, its Member States in a 
legal bind. On the one hand, at th e international level, they had an obligation to ensure the 
application  of  UNSC  Resolution  1267,  against  the  persons  enumerated  by  the  1267 
Committee, an obligation which is paramount, according to Article 103 UNC, and leaves no 
margin of appreciation to the State, as per the text of the Resolution. On the other hand, the 
Member States had pooled this responsibility at the European level, through the Council, and 
discharged it through a Council Regulation. This Regulation was found to be unlawful under 
EU law, while at the same time, the Member States were not able to make national rules on 
the matter. Thus, they were prevented from discharging their international, UN -mandated 
obligation by an international, EU-mandated obligation! 
I would posit that this re sult is a blatant manifestation of judicial antagonism to a 
system of sanctions seen as partial, political, and dismissive of human rights and procedural 
guarantees. It is a judicial reaction towards the monopolization of sanction power against 
individuals at the level of the UNSC, where it is immune from any kind of judicial review. It 
is, thus, a revolt of the European legal spirit against a type of world governance which does 
not share its human rights and procedural values. Below,  I will expose the alte rnative 
approach taken by the ECtHR to the same issues. 
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44  The  Nada  case  concerns  not  an  asset  freeze,  but  a  travel  ban.  Mr  Nada  is  a 
businessman living in the town of Campione d'Italia, which is an enclave of Italy in the 
South-East of Switzerland, fully surrounded by this country. In 2000, the 1267 Committee 
decided to list Mr Nada on its Consolidated List. After joining the United Nations on 10 
September 2002, Switzerland implemented the travel ban against Mr Nada, who was thus 
prevented from leaving the town of Campione d'Italia even in order to enter Italy. Since there 
were no alternate means of transport, apart from car, between the town and the rest of Italy, 
Mr Nada was in effect barred from seeking medical treatment in his own country
49. It is 
worthy  to note that the implementation of the sanctions was undertaken by Switzerland 
through a Federal Ordnance, with an Annex which fully reproduced the Consolidated List of 
the 1267 Committee. Mr Nada also applied for de -listing through the focal point procedure, 
but  his  application  was  denied due  to  the opposition  of  an  undisclosed  country.  After 
initiating a number of internal administrative appeals in Switzerland against his travel ban, the 
Swiss Federal Court rejected his final appeal. “It first pointed out that, under Article 25 of the 
[UNC], the UN member States had undertaken to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council in accordance with the Charter. It then observed that under Article 103 of 
the Charter the obligations arising from that instrument did not only prevail over the domestic 
law of the member States but also over obligations under other international agreements, 
regardless of their nature, whether bilateral or multilateral. It further stated that this primacy 
did not relate only to the Charter but extended to all obligations which arose from a binding 
resolution of the Security Council. The Federal Court observed, however, that the Security 
Council  was  itself  bound  by  the  Charter  and  was  required  to  act  in  accordance  with  its 
purposes and principles, which included respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
At the same time, it took the view that the member States were not permitted to avoid an 
obligation  on  the  grounds  that  a  decision  (or  resolution)  by  the  Security  Council  was 
substantively  inconsistent  with  the  Charter,  in  particular  decisions  (resolutions)  based  on 
Chapter VII thereof (action with the respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and 
acts of aggression)
50.” Article 190 of the Federal Constitution of Switzerland is a provision 
similar to that instituting the primacy of international law over internal law in Romania. In 
searching  for  a  rule  to  solve  a  situation  of  conflict  between  the  different  international 
obligations of States, the “Federal Court was of the opinion that the uniform application of 
UN sanctions would be endangered if the courts of States Parties to the European Convention 
or  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  were  able  to  disregard  those 
sanctions in order to protect the fundamental rights of certain individuals or organisations. 
The  court  nevertheless  accepted  that  the  obligation  to  implement  the  Security  Council's 
decisions was limited by norms of  jus cogens. Accordingly, it considered itself bound to 
ascertain  whether  the  sanctions  regime  set  up  by  the  Security  Council  was  capable  of 
breaching the peremptory norms of international law
51.” However, it found that the enjoyment 
of possessions, economic freedom, the guarantees of a fair trial or the right to an effective 
remedy did not fall within  jus cogens, and also found that Switzerland did not have any 
margin of appreciation in its application of the UNSC Resolution. By a procedure unknown to 
Mr Nada, his name was however deleted from the sanctions lists after the Federal Court case 
concluded. 
It is striking how similar the judgment of the Tribunal in Kadi I is with the judgment 
of the Federal Court. Both courts approached the problem according to approaches B and D 
illustrated at the beginning of the case presentations. Both courts found that the only way they 
could have checked the validity of the UNSC Sanctions Resolutions was by reference to jus 
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cogens,  and  that  the  lack  of  a  margin  of  appreciation  for  the  concerned  state  (the  EU, 
respectively)  meant  that  they  could  not  verify  the  legality  of  the  implementing  measures 
independently  of  that  of  the  UNSC  Resolutions,  thus  rejecting  the  claims.  We  will  see, 
however, the different approach taken by the ECtHR as opposed to the EU GC. 
45 In its assessment, the ECtHR first illustrated the applicable law, with reference to 
the UNC, the UNSC Sanctions Resolutions, as well as the Kadi I case. It also made a note of 
the case of Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium, which was dealt with by the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee. A relevant finding of the Committee was that, although Belgium was not 
competent to remove the names from the sanctions list, it had the duty to do all it could to 
obtain that deletion as soon as possible, to provide the complainants with compensation, to 
make public the requests for de-listing, and to ensure that similar violations did not occur in 
the future
52. The ECtHR also mentioned relevant cases at the national level, such as that of 
Ahmed and others v. HM Treasury (United Kingdom Supreme Court) and that of Abdelrazik 
v. Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs) (Canadian Federal Court). 
46 On the merits, the Court found that it had jurisdiction, even against Switzerland, as, 
due to the factual circumstances of the case, it was Switzerland, and not Italy, which was 
impeding the movement of Mr Nada. Mr Nada did have the status of “victim” in the sense of 
the  ECHR  and  that  he  had  exhausted  all  national  remedies.  Thus,  it  found  the  request 
admissible.  It  found that  the travel  ban constituted a significant  restriction  on Mr Nada's 
freedom,  especially  due  to  the  geographical  location  of  Campione  d'Italia
53. The ECtHR 
found that the limitation did have a legal basis and a legitimate aim. It approached the 
question  of  whether  it  was  “necessary  in  a  democratic  society”  by  first  asking  whether 
Switzerland had any margin of appreciation in implementing the Sanctions Resolutions. 
Here, the different points of view of the EU Courts and those of the ECtHR come into 
play. The ECtHR posited a principle that “the United Nations Charter does not impose on 
States a particular model for the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII. Without prejudice to the binding nature of such resolutions, the 
Charter in principle leaves to UN member States a free choice among the various possible 
models for transposition of those resolutions into their domestic legal order. The Charter thus 
imposes on States an obligation of result, leaving them to choose the means by which they 
give effect to the resolutions
54.” Basing itself on paragraph 2(b) of the relevant Sanctions 
Resolution, which said that the travel ban did not apply where entry or transit was “necessary” 
for the fulfilment of a judicial process, the Court took the view that the term “necessary” was 
to be construed on a case-by-case basis. It also found that the words “where appropriate” in 
the same Resolution, in the context of urging States to take immediate steps to enforce the 
sanctions meant that there was a certain flexibility given to the national authorities in the 
mode of implementation of the Resolution. Thus, the ECtHR found that “Switzerland enjoyed 
some  latitude,  which  was  admittedly  limited  but  nevertheless  real,  in  implementing  the 
relevant binding resolutions of the UNSC
55.” 
In my view, this is a completely different approach from that of the EU Courts. Instead 
of fragmenting international law into a “grand sphere” (the general international law) and a 
smaller and independent sphere (EU law) with its own hierarchy of norms, thus putting states 
in a wedge, the ECtHR maintains the unity of international law and the supremacy of UNC 
obligations, but uses a literal interpretation of the UNC, and of the Sanctions Resolutions, to 
“discover”  some  leeway  of  the  States  when  implementing  them.  It  is  a  wise  and 
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compassionate way of interpreting  apparently  conflicting norms, and one which does  not 
stand squarely against the very supremacy of UNC obligations. 
In  approaching  the  question  of  proportionality,  the  ECtHR  found  that  the  Swiss 
authorities, although cognizant of Mr Nada's situation, and having discovered themselves, 
through criminal investigations, that there was no case to build against him, did not take into 
account his specific situation, and that “the possibility of deciding how the relevant Security 
Council resolutions were to be implemented in the domestic legal order should have allowed 
some alleviation of the sanctions regime applicable to the applicant, having regard to those 
realities,  in  order to  avoid  interference  with  his  private and  family life, without however 
circumventing the binding nature of the relevant resolutions or compliance with the sanctions 
provided  for  therein
56.”  In  other  words,  and  here  the  ECtHR  is  admirably  square  in  its 
appreciation, regardless of the hierarchy of norms between the ECHR and UNC obligations, 
“the  important  point  is  that  the  respondent  Government  have  failed  to  show  that  they 
attempted, as far as possible, to harmonise the obligations that they regarded as divergent
57.” 
Therefore, the measures were not proportionate and therefore not necessary in a democratic 
society, and therefore there was a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR. 
The ECtHR also found a violation of Article 13 of the ECHR on the basis that, even if 
Mr Nada was able to appeal administratively up to the Federal Court, the fact that this latter 
Court considered itself unable to order the de-listing of his name, there was no remedy in 
respect of the Convention violations
58. On the other hand, the ECtHR found that Mr Nada was 
not deprived of his liberty, even in light of the quite small area of Campione d'Italia. 
47 The Al-Dulimi ruling, which was only very recently published, and for now only in 
the  French  language,  was  also  addressed  against  Switzerland  and  concerns  the  “1518 
Sanctions Committee” which was empowered to establish a list of persons whose assets were 
to be frozen, and given to the Development Fund of Iraq, as a sanction for being members of 
the  former  Iraqi  regime.  Switzerland  implemented  these  sanctions  through  administrative 
decisions,  which  were  contested  within  the  Swiss  court  system  by  the  applicants.  After 
several appeals, the Federal Court did reject their application, basing its decision on a similar 
reasoning as that in the Nada case
59. 
48  After  reviewing  the  internat ional  and  national  law  and  jurisprudence,  as  it 
developed in the past few years, including the decisions presented in this article, the ECtHR 
proceeded to find the case admissible. It is on the merits that the ECtHR develops is specific 
approach started in the Nada case. Under the specific header of “Preliminary Question: the 
coexistence of guarantees under the Convention [ECHR] and of obligations imposed on States 
by  the  resolutions  of  the  Security  Council”  the  ECtHR  deals  for  the  first  time  by  an 
international  judicial  forum,  squarely,  with  the  relationship  between  the  two  sources  of 
obligations. 
The ECtHR reminds that the ECHR must be interpreted in a manner which can be 
reconciled  with  the  general  principles  of  international  law.  It  bases  this  interpretation  on 
Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, but giving a specific 
weight  to  human  rights  treaties
60. The ECtHR also establishes a principle that there is a 
presumption that the UNSC does not mean to impose on Member States any obligation which 
would be contrary to the fundamental principles of human rights protection, unless there was 
a very clear language to this effect in the Resolution itself
61. 
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The ECtHR distinguishes the Al-Dulimi case from Nada on the basis that, as opposed 
to Nada, the relevant Resolution did not leave any margin of appreciation to Switzerland
62. It 
finds that the focal-point system does not offer a protection of human rights equivalent to the 
one required by the ECHR, a fact recognized by the UN Specia l Rapporteur on the matter. 
Therefore, the Court affirms that the national tribunals should have made a full examination 
of the facts alleged by the applicants, in order to give them a fair hearing on the merits of their 
listing
63. The ECtHR finds a violation of Article 6(1) of the ECHR, and that the rest of the 
allegations were not receivable for the rest. 
It is quite a remarkable ruling, in my opinion, in light of the enumerated principles, but 
also of the proposed solution. Thus, the main principle establ ished by the ECtHR is that 
apparently conflicting international obligations must be interpreted in a way which makes 
them compatible with one another. In light of the fact that there was no margin of appreciation 
left for Switzerland by the UNSC Resolution, and also that there was no adequate mechanism 
of listing review at the UN level, the ECtHR offered the solution that Switzerland itself 
should have provided the required review. 
In light of this affair, we are left with one question: what would happen if , after a full 
review on the merits by Swiss courts, finding that the listing was not justified, followed by 
specific  requests  of  Switzerland  for  de -listing  to  the  UNSC,  the  de -listing  would  be 
unsuccessful? Would Switzerland still be found guilty of the v iolation of ECHR or not? In 
light of the Court's approach, I believe not, because, under that situation, the ECtHR would 
accept the general hierarchy of international law norms. 
Going back to the title of this article, it is also interesting to note that the ECtHR ruling 
is also a form of judicial dialogue with the UNSC, and specifically with the relevant Sanctions 
Committees, but also with the State Parties to the ECHR, inviting them to further develop the 
system of human rights protections within the targ eted sanctions regimes. The Court puts 
forward not only a stick (the threat of finding further violations of the ECHR), but also a 
carrot (the possibility that the UNSC system would be recognized as meeting the guarantees 
of the Convention, and thus escaping review by the ECtHR). 
49 In Table 4 a summary of the different approaches taken by the European courts is 
made, by way of conclusion. “Both sets of reasoning are bound to be very influential, as they 
involved two of Europe's most powerful and prestigious courts. Whereas the ECtHR informs 
the jurisprudence of 47 states that constitute the membership of the Council of Europe, the 
CJEU impacts the legal developments in 27 states which make up the EU. Moreover, all 27 
EU member states (two of which are permanent members of the UNSC) are also members of 
the Council of Europe and therefore need to take into consideration the jurisprudence of both 
the ECtHR and the CJEU
64.” It will be interesting to see if, via other similar cases, these 
approaches will be taken further on their separate pathways, or will be somehow reconciled 
with one another. 
Table 4. Summary of European judicial approaches to targeted sanctions 
European Court of Justice  European Court of Human Rights 
At international law, UNC obligations are prevalent over any others, except for jus cogens 
obligations 
The Court does not have any jurisdiction to review the UNSC Resolutions, but only the 
implementing measures 
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Within  the  EU  normative  system,  UNC 
obligations  are  superior  to  secondary  law,  but 
not to the fundamental EU Treaties 
Although  the  UNC  obligations  are 
superior  to  the  ECHR,  they  must  be 
interpreted in such a way in which they 
are made compatible as far as possible 
Therefore,  if  a  secondary  rule  of  EU  law 
implements UNC obligations in a way which is 
incompatible  with  Treaty  principles,  the 
secondary rule should be anulled 
Therefore,  if  the  Member  State  did  not 
take absolutely every measure to  ensure 
the furthest compatibility of the two sets 
of obligations, then the state is in breach 
of the ECHR obligations 
The effect is that the act through which the states 
implement  their  UNC  obligations  is  annuled, 
leaving them without the legal means to execute 
their international obligations 
The  effect  is  that  the  state  is  given  the 
means  to  rectify  its  breach  of  ECHR 
obligations,  without  putting  it  in  a 
situation where it would violate its UNC 
obligations 
Further,  there  is  a  clear  fragmentation  of  the 
system of international law 
The  EctHR  promotes  the  fundamental 
unity of the system of international law
65 
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